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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff & Appellant, 
vs. 
CITY OF OGDEN, UTAH, a municipal 
corporation; UTAH STATE ROAD 
COMMISSION: OSCAR A. ROBIN; and 
HARDY SCALES CO., a corporation, 
Defendants & Respondents. 
CASE NO. 14030 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS ROBIN AND HARDY SCALES COMPANY 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
These respondents agree with the appe l lan t ' s statement 
of the nature of the c a s e . 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The t r i a l court entered judgment in favor ef a l l 
defendants and respondents, no cause of a c t i o n . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondents Robin and Hardy Scales Company 
seek an affirmance of the t r i a l cour t ' s judgment that p l a i n t i f f 
has no cause for ac t ion against them. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While the a p p e l l a n t ' s statement of f a c t s i s general ly 
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correct, these respondents must controvert the same in some 
particulars and it is necessary to supplement the same for a 
full and fair completeness, all as hereinafter specified. 
Let us start from the beginning. 
The property in question was originally owned by the 
State of Utah. In 1949 the State Quitclaimed the property to 
Ogden City, but in its Quitclaim Deed it specifically reserved 
from the conveyance "all coal, oil, gas, mines, metals, grave1 
and other minerals of whatsoever kind or nature in the above land/1 
with the right to enter upon the land and remove the same. (Exhibit 
B t£ the Pre-Trial Order» R. 355. (Emphasis Supplied.) 
Next, in 1965, the Utah State Road Commission obtained 
from Ogden City the option in question, Exhibit A to the Pre-Trial 
Order. (R. 353-354). The option is correctly quoted on Pages 3 
and 4 of the plaint iff-appellant's brief. The option was never 
acknowledged or recorded so as to give notice of its existence and 
contents to others who might become interested in the land. 
The Trial Court found (Finding 1, R# 510) on the 
uncontradicted testimony of Richard N. Griffin, of the State Road 
Commission staff, that the option agreement was prepared and the 
wording thereof chosen by the representatives and employees of 
the Utah State Road Commission. 
-2-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Richard N. Griffin, the State Road Commission employee 
who drafted the option agreement, called as a witness by the 
plaintiff, testified without any contradiction that the ''special 
stipulations" inserted in the option agreement to the effect that 
the owner will be contacted and essential arrangements made lffor 
each, or any, occupancy and removal of material,11 that all 
stipulations regarding work areas "and any other pertinent 
agreements" shall be made before entry on the property, and, 
particularly that "the removal of any material coming within the 
scope of this option must positively be removed to the ownerfs 
line8 and grades/1 (Emphasis Supplied) were inserted for the 
protection of the property owner (R# 585)• Whatever the custom 
of the Road Commission may have been in drafting such options to 
include a provision that any materials removed shall be strictly 
to the "ownerfs lines and grades," in this particular case, the 
city engineer, with whom Griffin discussed the mattei; specifically 
requested that provision (&# 757, 758), obviously with the idea of 
of protecting his employer city and its successors in interest. 
While Mr* Mike Gibbons, the plaintiff-appellantfs officer 
in charge, discussed the option with Mr. Kimball, Assistant Ogden 
City Engineer, and received verification of its existence and saw 
a copy thereof, Mr, Kimball didn't recall even discussing the 
.3. 
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quantities that might be removed (R. 787), and after hearing all 
of the evidence, the Honorable Trial Court found (Finding 3, R. 
510) as a fact that the plaintiff had failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence either that Kimball had any 
authority from Ogden City to specify or determine the amount of 
material available under the option, or that Kimball or any other 
officer of Ogden City agreed, stated or represented that plaintiff 
would have the right under the option to obtain Four Hundred Ninety 
Eight Thousand ( 498,000) cubic yards of materials (as claimed by 
plaintiff) or any other amount of materials from the site in 
question. In February of 1966, plaintiff-appellant signed its 
construction contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit M) with the State Road 
Commission, As conceded by plaintiff-appellant, the specifications 
forming a part of the construction contract referred to possible 
commission-heId options to purchase materials and required the 
contractor, if he desired to obtain material pursuant to the 
options, to "comply with and fulfill all terms and conditions as 
may be stipulated in the option. . . • and shall notify the owner 
of the property of his intent to exercise the option before 
entering on the property/1 (Emphasis Supplied.) 
There is TK> evidence in the record that plaintiff-
appellant ever exercised or attempted to exercise the option. 
-4-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the spring of 1966, as stated by plaintiff-appellant, 
Ogden City entered into negotiations for the sale of the property 
to Mr* Oscar A. Robin, who was the president and sole stockholder 
of Hardy Scales Company• 
Mr. Richard P. Reed, a Vice-President of the plaintiff-
appellant, testified that in May of 1966 he learned by a telephone 
call from a local company employee (Mr. William Eccles) that the 
City was reportedly selling the optioned property (R. 629-630). 
Reed then called Mr. Kay, of the State Road Commission Staff, who 
suggested that he check with Hardy Scales. So, as Mr. Reed, 
testified, he arranged a visit with Clay Barnard, a local 
representative of Hardy Scales and inquired about the availability 
of materials. Reed further testified that Barnard told him that 
they planned on building on the site, but "that he could not give 
me an answer what could be done. . . . he would have to talk to 
his boss." (R. 631-& 647.) 
Mr. Reed testified that he then attempted to arrange a 
meeting with Barnard and an architect, Mr. Piers, who was reported 
to be working on a project for plans for the proposed building, 
but Mr. Barnard did not come to that meeting. However, Reed 
indicated that from Mr. Piers he "got the feeling we were going to 
beat a dead horse on this property so far as Hardy Scales was 
concerned." (R. 631.) 
-5-
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However, instead of identifying and communicating with 
Mr. Barnard's "boss" as suggested, Mr. Reed, as he testified, met 
with the Ogden City Manager and some Counselmen at the Weber Club 
on May 17, 1966, where, as Reed testified, the Manager, Mr. Hood, 
told him that the city had made a deal with Hardy Scales and that 
the property would not be available. The city officials there 
apparently offered to find substitute materials. (R. 632 & 640). 
Reed then told the City Officials that there were two routes for 
the City: (1) The City could break the "lease" (apparently an 
accidential misnomer; the witness meant by this the deal with 
Hardy Scales (R. 653-654) and let Gibbons and Reed have the 
material or (2) the City could find other material (R.633). Reed 
himself testified that he made no demand for performance of the 
option by Ogden City (R. 640-641). Mr. Reed said that he made no 
threat of action on the option because the City, at that meeting 
undertook to get other materials (R. 641), and no demand was made 
on the City to produce the materials under the option (R. 645). 
Reed further testified that as soon as the City authorities told 
him there were other properties to get material from, his company 
didn't pursue the matter with Hardy Scales (R. 646-7). This was 
on May 17th. 
On May 20th Mr. Robin came to town and purchased and 
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paid for the surface rights to the tract in question and the City 
executed and delivered to him its Warranty Deed conveying the 
surface rights to the property to ffOscar A* Robin, President of 
Hardy Scales Company1' (Exhibit C to the Pre-Trial Order, R. 356A-
357), and Robin, as part of the transaction executed and delivered 
to the City his covenant and agreement, (Plaintiff's Exhibit D to 
the Pre-Trial Order, R. 360-362). As both documents show, they 
were recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Weber 
County, Utah, on the same day, from which moment, under the law, 
plaintiff-appellant had notice of the contents of both documents. 
The Deed to Robin from the City specifically and excepted 
and reserved from the property conveyed "all coal, oil, gas, mines, 
metals, gravel and all other material/1 and the right to prospect 
for and remove the same. Mr. Robin testified without 
contradiction, that it was his intent and purpose, in accordance 
with an established practice, to acquire ownership of the property 
personally» with the idea that, if the development proceeded, he 
would make improvements and then lease the improved property to 
Hardy Scales, the corporation. The court found that this was the 
intent of the parties, and that Robin personally became the owner 
of the property (Finding 5, R. 511). 
It should be noted that the testimony of Mr. Reed with 
~7-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
respect to his communications with Clay Barnard were admitted 
over the objections that there was no proof that Barnard had any 
authority to speak or act for Mr. Robin, and that the court 
reserving its ruling. The plaintiff•appellant1s statement on 
Page 9 of its brief that Barnard was "the only person in the 
State of Utah dealing for Mr* Robin prior to his appearance in 
Utah on May 19 and 20 to sign the contract ," is inaccurate and 
misleading. And the only evidence in the case is the testimony 
of Mr, Robin that Barnard was an employee of Hardy Scales in 
charge of its local manufacturing and sales operation but never 
had any authority for that company with respect to any real 
property transaction and never had any authority to represent 
Robin in any matter and had never previously represented Robin in 
any matter (R. 720-723, & 727). Further, the architect Piers had 
no authority to represent Robin in any matters, Robin had never 
even met him (R, 727). 
Further, the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Robin is 
that when he acquired the property he had an open mind on the 
removal of some fill dirt, which could have improved his property. 
He did hear from Mr. Barnard that a Gibbons and Reed representative 
had approached him (Barnard), but that Barnard had told him that 
they had to get in touch with Mr. Robin. However Robin never 
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received any communications from Gibbons and Reed on the subject 
(R. 725-728). Upon this testimony and the testimony of Mr. Reed 
that he never pursued the matter of the option after the City 
authorities indicated that they would find substitute materials, 
the Trial Court found that Gibbons and Reed never communicated 
with Robin to exercise the option or to make arrangements to fix 
lines and grades for removal of material (R. 511f Finding 6). 
While Mr. Robin knew that the City had a contract with 
the Road Commission concerning the removal of fill his only 
information concerning the same was received from Ogden City, 
which drew the COVENANT AND AGREEMENT (Plaintiff's Exhibit D to 
the Pre-Trial Order, R. 360 et seq.) in which he agreed that he 
would give the Road Commission first right to purchase fill on 
the same terms and conditions as the contract in the event he 
should within One (1) year after the date of his purchase decide 
to sell fill from the land. There is, however, no evidence that 
the City or anyone else told him that the contract amounted to 
anything more than the "first refusal" in the event he should 
decide to sell. Obviously the City authorities gave him their 
own interpretation of the option they had signed and that it did 
not obligate him to sell any fill, as he could fix the lines and 
grades, and the State or its successors had the burden of 
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approaching the owner to make all arrangements before anything 
could be taken* There is nothing in the record to indicate that 
he had any reason to distrust the adequacy of the information 
given him by the City Officials with respect to an unrecorded 
document and which would require him to make an affirmative 
investigation to ascertain the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth about this unrecorded document• On Page 9 
of the brief of plaintiff-appellant it is stated that as a result 
of the refusal of Mr. Barnard and an architect considering plans 
for building on the property to let Gibbons and Reed to remove 
fill (not true, as above noted) "Gibbons and Reed Company was 
forced to obtain fill material from other sources and incurred 
increased costs. • .
 #
fl
 It is respectfully submitted that this 
conclusion of fact is totally inaccurate and contrary to the 
evidence. The trial court, on the evidence, specifically found 
that plaintifffs damages were not caused by any breach of contract 
or any misrepresentation on the part of the defendants or any of 
them, but were caused and resulted from the misunderstanding and 
misapprehension of the plaintiff and its representatives with 
respect to the terms of the option agreement and the effect thereof 
and the failure of the plaintiff and its representatives to take 
reasonable and effective steps to exercise the option by notice 
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
thereof to Robin and the negotiation of a essential arrangements 
for removal of material and the establishment of the owner's 
lines and grades (Finding 7, R* 512). As indicated, the evidence 
supports this finding of the Trial Court* 
At the conclusion of the evidence, pursuant to Rule 15(b), 
URCP, defendants Robin and Hardy Scales Company moved the court 
for an order amending their answer and the Pre-Trial Order to 
state as additional defense and issue that the option, Exhibit A, 
was void under the Utah Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-3, UCA, 
in that it failed to state the lines and grades for removal, the 
specific portions of the land and earth which could be removed, 
or to fix the quantity thereof by any other measure, and hence 
failed to describe the real property subject thereto on the 
grounds, contemplated by the Rule, that all of the facts necessary 
to the determination of such issues had been tried to and were then 
before the court. The court reserved judgment on the motions* 
(R. 793 & 796.) The court later concluded that its decision upon 
the grounds included in its findings and conclusions made it 
unnecessary to decide the other issues before it, and so it never 
decided the motions or the issue involved thereunder. (Conclusion 
of Law 5, R. 513.) 
No action was commenced against defendant-respondents 
-11-
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Robin and Hardy Scales Company until plaintiff filed herein its 
Second Amended Complaint on October 1, 1970, naming them as 
defendants for the first time. Plaintiff then issued Summons 
against them and caused it to be served upon them in the State of 
California on November 20, 1970, (R, 59-66, & 67-72)# The claim 
against Robin and Hardy Scales is set out in the THIRD CLAIM (R. 
63-64) of the Second Amended Complaint, No where in plaintifffs 
pleading does it allege that any of the business done or acts 
performed upon which it bases its Third Claim were done or 
performed within the State of Utah, nor does it attempt to allege, 
even indirectly any other facts bringing its claim within the 
special scope or provisions of the Utah "Long-Arm" Statute, 
Section, 78-27-22, UCA, and following. 
These defendants interposed as a defense the court's 
lack of jurisdiction of their persons (R*74), The plaintiff 
served these defendants with certain Interrogatories (R. 78 & 
following)o These defendants objected thereto upon the ground 
that the Utah Court had not acquired and did not have jurisdiction 
of their persons so that they were not before the court, and until 
they were before the court as parties, they could not be required 
to answer Interrogatories to parties under Rule 33« URCP, The 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, District Judge, heard and sustained 
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these objections upon the grounds that the complaint failed to 
state on its face facts sufficient to invoke the Long-Arm 
Statute or to bring the defendants within the jurisdiction of 
process of the Utah Courts when served in the State of California 
(R. 104). 
Thereafter plaintiff moved the Trial Court to determine 
before trial the issues of personal jurisdiction of Robin and 
Hardy Scales Company as raised by their first and second defenses 
(R# 74-75) attacking the sufficiency of service of summons 
outside the State of Utah and the court's jurisdiction of these 
California residents (R. 118-119). At the hearing on plaintiff's 
said motions, on January 12, 1972, these defendants moved for a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction (Court Minutes, R. 152). 
after extensive arguments and briefing before the Honorable Calvin 
Gould, District Judge, in which it was submitted, among other 
things, that the ruling of the Honorable Judge Hyde determined 
for the purpose of this action that the Utah District Court had 
not acquired jurisdiction, Judge Gould denied these defendants1 
motions for dismissal, but in his order specified that the question 
°f ill personam jurisdiction over these defendants was to be 
determined at the trial on the merits. 
The question of jurisdiction over their persons and the 
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question of the va l id i ty of the option agreement under the Utah 
Statute of Frauds were reserved in the court's Pre-Trial Orders 
and the amendments thereof. 
As above indicated, the Honorable Trial Judge who 
heard the case on the merits, having ruled that the option was 
void for indefiniteness and that p la int i f f had never e f fect ive ly 
exercised the same, and that these defendants had never 
interfered with performance thereof, found i t unnecessary to 
rule on these i s sues , on the ground that they were rendered moot 
by the court's decision on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE OPTION AGREEMENT MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST 
THE OPTIONEE-DRAFTER THEREOF. 
It is elementary and general law, followed in Utah, 
that an option agreement for the purchase of land or any interest 
therein is to be construed strictly against the optionee and 
liberally in favor of the optionor, and this is particularly true 
where the agreement is prepared by the optionee, as in the case 
at bar. 91 C.J.S. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. Section 8; Jensen v. 
Anderson. 24 Utah 2nd 191, 468 P. 2nd 366; RESTATEMENT OF THE 
LAW: CONTRACTS, Section 236(d); 17A C.J.S. CONTRACTS. Section 
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324. Note 98; and Seal v. Tayco. Inc.., 16 Utah 2nd 323, 400 P. 
2nd 503, 
Accordingly, the "option" before the court must be 
construed most strictly against the State Road Commission and its 
contractor, Gibbons and Reed Company, 
II 
THE OPTION AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH PLAINTIFF CLAIMS IS 
VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE, (A) FOR LACK OF CERTAINTY AS TO THE 
SUBJECT MATTER, AND (B) FOR FAILURE TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE UTAH STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Upon inspection of the alleged "option" it is at once 
apparent (as it was to the learned Trial Court) that there is 
nothing contained in the option which fixes either the quantity 
of material to be taken from the property or the location either 
horizontally or vertically, of the portion of the overall property 
from which such material, if any, may be taken. It is no more 
than an agreement to the effect that the parties will thereafter 
agree upon the quantity of materials and the location within the 
three-dimensional boundaries of the Twenty (2 0) acre tract from 
which such materials, if any, may be taken. 
Paragraph One provides a specific price per yard for 
materials which may be taken "jLf and when this option is 
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exercised," (Emphasis Supplied,) That an affirmative act 
manifesting the optioneefs exercise is made clear by the "special 
provisions11 and by a provision of the plaintiff fs Exhibit M (the 
plaintiff's construction contract) which requires that if the 
contractor desires to obtain materials thereunder he shall 
"notify the owner of the property of his intent to exercise the 
option before entering on the property," And in Paragraph Four 
of the "option," consisting of special provisions, specially 
typed into the Road Commission's mimeographed form, it is 
provided that "This option i£ for the purpose of establishing the 
price" at which materials will be available to the commission. 
(Emphasis Supplied.) It is also provided that "it (the option)" 
shall also cover special conditions affecting the availability 
and removal. It shall not be construed to mean that the Road 
Commission shall have a sole or prior right to all the materials 
on the above described property. . . .The owner or his authorized 
representative will be contacted and essential arrangements for 
each, OR ANY, occupation and removal of materials. . . .The removal 
of any material coming within the scope of this option must 
positively be removed to the owner's lines and grades." (Emphasis 
Supplied.) Of course the word "lines" refers to the horizontal 
boundary lines of the area from which the owner may permit 
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materials to be taken, and the word "grades" refers to the 
vertical boundaries, or distance below the surface below which no 
materials may be taken. And these words, as the Road Commission's 
official, Mr. Griffin, testified^were intended to protect the 
interests of the owner. 
Inasmuch as the option specifically declares that it 
does not mean that the optionee has a right to all materials, 
down to the center of the earth, the question immediately arises 
as to how much material is covered by the option. The only 
answer given to this is the special provision that the owner will 
be contacted and essential arrangements made for each or any 
removal of materials and that stipulations regarding work areas, 
residual condition of the property "and any other pertinent 
agreements" shall be made before entry for removal of building 
material, and that the removal of the material must positively 
be to the ownerfs lines and grades. It is submitted that it is, 
under the circumstances, really too clear for argument that the 
location and the quantity of materials to be removed was, by the 
terms of the contract, left to the absolute and uncontrolled 
discretion of the owner. 
The plaintiff-appellantfs argument that the court 
should construe the contract as if it provided for the removal of 
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a "reasonable amount11 of materials, to be fixed by the Court, is 
clearly invalid and unsupportable. It invites the Court to 
substitute a new and different contract for the one written by 
the parties, by striking therefrom the clear and unequivocal 
provision that the removal of any material must positively be to 
the owner's lines and grades, and to substitute for it a 
provision to the effect that the material to be removed lfshall be 
in a reasonable amount t£ be^  fixed by the court/1 Can the Court 
imagine that if such a change in wording had been suggested to 
the parties when the option was being drawn that they would have 
accepted the suggested substitute? Of course not! 
And the evidence is that the requirement for removal to 
the owner's lines and grades was inserted, not only pursuant to 
custom, but because of a demand by the City Engineer, Mr* Kelly, 
for the protection of the property owner* It clearly expressed 
the intention of the parties* As this court has had more than 
one occasion to observe, it is not the function of the Court to 
rewrite the contracts of the parties who come before it* 
Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2nd 61, 362 P. 2nd 427. 
In the second place, even if the argument of plaintiff-
appellant as to a "reasonable quantity11 could be adopted, it 
still leaves unresolved the equally insurmountable problem of 
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determining the location and the area of the particular portion 
or portions of the Twenty (2 0) acre tract from which Gibbons and 
Reed would be permitted to take materials if[ and when the 
quantities of materials have been fixed by the owner. 
It is abundantly clear that the Honorable Trial Court 
was correct in concluding that the porported option is void for 
uncertainty, as there are no standards whatsoever by which the 
intention of the parties as to the quantity or place of removal can 
be determined, both of these necessary factors being left for 
future determination by the owner at his uncontrolled discretion 
or whim. See 17. CJS Contracts« Section 36(2)e and 17 Am Jur, 2nd, 
Contracts» Section 81. See also the annotation at 21^  ALR 2nd 
1066, Section £• And it is the accepted rule in Utah that a 
contract is unenforceable where the particular portion of a 
larger tract of land, which portion is to be the subject of a 
contract, is not definitely ascertainable, and that a contract is 
equally void and unenforceable where the quantity of subject 
matter cannot be definitely ascertained from the contract. 
Pitcher v. Lauritzen, !L8 Utah 2nd 368. 423 Pac. 2nd 491, and Owyhee« 
Inc., v. Robins Marco Polo, 17 Utah 2nd 181» 407 Pac« 2nd 565/ 
See also Davis v. Flagstaff Silver Mining Company» £ Utah 74,, 9£, 
holding a contract unenforceable where it binds one party, but not 
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the other party, who could ignore it at his pleasure. 
The so-called option is also void and unenforceable 
because it fails to satisfy the requirements of Utah's Statute 
of Frauds, Sections 25-5-1 and 25-5-3, UCA, 
It is established in Utah, as elsewhere, that an option 
to purchase is an interest in real estate and within the Statute 
of Frauds. Coombs v# Ouzounlan, 24 Utah 2nd 39, 465 Pac. 2nd 
356, and Knight v. Chamberlain, £ Utah 2nd 394, 315 Pac. 2nd 273, 
275. 
Perhaps it should also be noted that the right purported 
to be granted in the option to remove soil, sand and gravel from 
the city's land is an interest in real property, a "profit a 
prendre,11 and within the scope of the Statute of Frauds. 
Ballentinefs Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Page 1005; 72 Am Jur 
Statute of Frauds, 
2nd,/Section 51; and 34, Words & Phrases, Permanent Edition, 
Profit a prendre, Page 441. It is the established law in Utah, as 
elsewhere, that a written memorandum of a contract for the sale 
of any interest in lands, in order to satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds, must contain "a definite agreement as to the extent and 
boundaries of the property11 subject to the contract. (Emphasis 
Supplied). See Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Company, 121 Utah 
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412« 242 P. 2nd 578, approved and followed in a damage action 
based on the alleged contract in Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Utah 
2nd 291, 495 P. 2nd 814. In Blrdzell the court held that a 
memorandum of an alleged lease of land was void because it did 
not describe specifically and definitely the precise portion of 
the leasorfs lands which was to be the subject of the lease. In 
the case at bar it is clear that the material to be removed was 
not all the land owned by the City, to the center of the earth, 
and the uncertainty is therefore three-dimensional rather than 
merely two dimensional as to the description. 
If there were any previous doubts as to this 
proposition it was laid to rest by the very recent decision of 
this Honorable Court in Davison v. Robins, 30 Utah 2nd 338. 517 
£• 2nd 1026. In that case the seller signed a contract on a 
prepared printed short form which recited that the legal 
description was to be prepared by a licensed engineer after 
survey, and that lfLand being sold consists of approximately One 
Hundred Fifty (150) acres. . . ." It also provided that 
^property in question is briefly described in preliminary title 
report number U-102434. . . ., less any acreage reserved by 
seller. Offer contingent upon buyer's approval of net acreage 
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description, . . .M (Emphasis by the Court.) This Court ruled 
that the description of the subject matter was insufficient to 
constitute a binding and enforceable contract, as the seller had 
a right to reserve any acreage out of the described tract, and 
then the contract would be contingent upon the buyer's 
willingness to accept the acreage which the vendor subsequently 
determined he was willing to sell. The Court distinquished an 
earlier case where the vendee had been granted power to make the 
determination of the land which he wished to buy. The case at 
bar is clearly subject to the rule of Davison« because here, as 
in Davison, it is the vendor (city and its successors) which has 
the right to determine the lines and grades, that is, the 
location, portion and quantity of the land affected thereby. 
It is respectfully submitted that the purported option agreement 
is totally void and ineffective for lack of sufficient certainty 
to be enforceable and for failure to specify the location and 
quantity of land and material to be taken as required by the 
Statute of Frauds, and that the careful decision and judgment 
of the Honorable Trial Court should be affirmed. 
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Ill 
THE OPTION, EVEN IF VALID, WAS NEVER EFFECTIVELY 
EXERCISED AND NEVER BECAME A BINDING CONTRACT TO SELL MATERIALS 
FROM THE LANDS. 
It is, of course, an elementary rule of law, followed 
in Utah, that while an option to purchase, if based upon a 
sufficient consideration, binds the Grantor, it is not a contract 
of purchase until the option is accepted and performed, but is 
simply a contract granting the holder the privilege of forming a 
binding contract of sale and purchase by proper acceptance in 
time. Tilton v. Sterling Coal & Coke Company. 2£ Utah 173. 77 
P. 758; Williams v. Espey, 11 Utah 2nd 317, 358 P. 2nd, 903. 
«• mmmmmmmm" mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm mmm mmmmmmmmmm* mmmmmm mmmmmmmmm M M I M W M M M M ' mmmmmmm mm» I M M M I ' «WWMI* 
The trial court found (Finding 7, R. 512) that plaintiff's 
damages were not caused by any breach of contract or misrepresen-
tations on the part of any of the defendants, but were caused and 
naturally resulted from a misunderstanding and misapprehension of 
the plaintiff and its representatives with respect to the terms 
of the option agreement and the effect thereof, and the failure 
of the plaintiff and its representatives to take reasonable and 
effective steps to exercise the option by notice thereof to 
defendant Robin and the negotiation of essential arrangements for 
the occupancy of the property, removal of materials and the 
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establishment of the owner fs lines and grades to which the 
materials might be removed. This finding of the Trial Court, is 
amply supported in the evidence* 
Of course, the appellant and its representatives, are 
bound to know the established law of contract and operate within 
its purview just as much as Mr* Robin, or the City Counselmen or 
any other citizen, but notwithstanding that fact and notwithstandin 
the clear statement of the purported option that materials, if 
any, must be removed positively to the ownerfs lines and grades, it 
merely made inquiries of unauthorized personnel in the City 
Engineering Department and wishfully thought that they had an 
oral resolution of the uncertainties as to quantity (but not as 
to location) of the materials wished for* 
The burden, of course, was on plaintiff to prove all of 
the elements of its claimed contract, but it produced no evidence 
that it ever exercised the option by notice as required by the 
option and by its contract with the Road Commission, Exhibit M* 
Plaintiff-appellant argues in its brief that the option was 
exercised on May 17th at the meeting of its Vice-President, Richar 
Reed, with the Ogden City Manager and some Counselmen. However, 
as hereinbefore noted, Reed's own testimony is only to the effect 
that the manager confirmed that a deal had been made to sell the 
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property to Hardy Scales, and offered to find substitute 
materials. Reed testified that then, instead of demanding 
performance of the option, he accepted the City's offer to find 
other material* In effect it was an accord and satisfaction of 
any claim plaintiff might have had under the purported option, 
and a release of rights under the option rather than an exercise 
thereof. 
Further, Mr. Reed testified that after receiving the 
City's proposal to look for other sources, nothing was done by 
Gibbons and Reed to pursue Hardy Scales or Mr. Robin any further. 
These matters, be it remembered, took place Three (3) days before 
May 20th when the sale of the surface rights in the land to Mr. 
Robin was consummated and the Deed to him, with his agreement to 
give the Road Commission first refusal as to fill materials on 
the land, were recorded, giving notice to plaintiff of Robin's 
willingness to sell some fill materials if the option were 
exercised. 
And it should be noted in passing that nothing done by 
any of the defendants in any way hindered or prevented plaintiff 
from exercising the option at or after the time of this meeting 
by saying or writing to the City and to Robin, as required by the 
option and constriction contract that the company exercise the 
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option and request that the owner fix the lines and grades, 
which would determine the quantities, to be removed* 
Notwithstanding the rumors it heard about a deal with Hardy 
Scales, it could still have complied with the necessary legal 
formality of notifying the owner and/or the owner's successor 
that the option was exercised* Whether through negligence, 
ignorance or inattention it failed to do so and as a result at 
best had an uncertain option and not a contract formed by the 
required acceptance of the option-offer. And it has no one to 
blame but itself for this neglect. Even if the conveyance to 
Robin were a repudiation by the City, there is no excuse 
whatsoever for failing to communicate with Robin and notify him, 
as the successor with notice of the alleged option, that the 
existing option on the land purchased is exercised. 
NEITHER ROBIN NOR HARDY SCALES COMPANY IS LIABLE TO 
PLAINTIFF FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH THE ALLEGED OPTION 
AGREEMENT. 
The Gravamen of plaintiff-appellant's claim against 
Robin and Hardy Scales is set out in "plaintiff fs claims11 in the 
Pre-Trial Order as drafted by counsel for plaintiff-appellant, on 
Page 3 thereof: 
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Defendants Robin and Hardy Scales intentionally 
and willfully interferred with plaintiff's 
rights under the option agreement, when, with 
knowledge of its existence, they induced 
defendant Ogden City to sell them the subject 
property under a contract by the terms of which 
said defendants were obligated only to offer 
road building materials to plaintiff if they 
decided to sell such materials. 
However, the UNCONTROVERTED FACTS established by the 
Pre-Trial Order (Paragraphs 3.d. & 3.e.) show that when Ogden 
City acquired title the State of Utah reserved "all coal, oil, 
gas, mines, metals, gravel and all other minerals," and the right 
to prospect for and remove the same. (Emphasis Supplied.) And 
the Deed of May 20, 1966, from the City to Mr. Robin accepted 
and reserved "all coal, oil, gas, mines, metals, gravel and all 
other materials" and the right to prospect for and remove the 
same. (Emphasis Supplied.) 
It is further uncontroverted that, so far as known, the 
land in question consists of fine and coarse sand with some gravel. 
Sand, of course, is basically the same material as gravel, the 
only distinction being that the sand comes in substantially 
smaller units or particles. Ballentinefs Law Dictionary. 3rd 
Edition» defines "gravel" as "a mixture of sand and small rocks." 
(Page 534.) It also defines "sand" as "A species of stone. .
 # . 
Disintegrated rock." (Page 1138.) And Webster's Seventh New 
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Collegiate Dictionary. 1970 Edition, defines "sand" as "a loose 
granular material resulting from the disintegration of rock that 
is used in mortar, glasss, abrasives, and foundry molds." Again 
Ballentlne's Law Dictionary. 3rd Edition, says of "mineral": 
'broadly, a natural inorganic substance forming a part of the soil 
or crust of the earth." It supplements its definition with a 
quotation from Jeffrey v. Spruce - Boone Land Company (West 
Virginia) 164 SE 292 as follows "In its ordinary and common 
meaning, the word is a comprehensive one and includes every 
description of stone and rock deposit, whether containing metallic 
or nonmetallic substances; and where minerals are reserved in a 
conveyance, if the ordinary meaning of the word is to be changed 
or restricted, the language used must be reasonably clear to show 
that intent#M There is, of course, nothing in these conveyances 
to show that the word was used in any restrictive sense, but on 
the contrary the language clearly indicates and intent to use it 
in the broadest possible sense, as it is explained that the 
substances excepted were minerals or materials "oi[ whatsoever kind 
or nature/1 
Accordingly, it is clear that Mr. Robin bought only 
surface rights and that all substances beneath the surface were 
reserved to the State of Utah and Ogden City never acquired title 
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thereto and never conveyed title thereto to Mr. Robin. And the 
option is indeed reduced to an absuridty: It purports to be an 
agreement by the City to sell to a State Agency materials which 
the State reserved and still owns.1 If Gibbons and Reed had paid 
attention to the public records, with which they were charged 
with knowledge, they would have realized that neither Ogden City 
nor defendants Robin nor Hardy Scales Company owned any interest 
in the fill materials in which plaintiffs were interested, no matter 
what they might assume. And it must be remembered that defendants 
Robin and Hardy Scales Company never signed any contract to sell 
these materials to the Road Commission or its contractor; if they 
are chargeable with an contractual obligation it is because they 
acquired the subject of the contract with knowledge of the 
encumbrance - and now it is clear that they never did acquire 
title to the subject of the contract, that is, to the sand and 
gravel constituting the fill material. If Mr. Robin had acquired 
it he would have been willing to sell the same in reasonable 
quantities, as he testified, but he was never approached or asked 
to do so* Nor did his purchase of the material make it impossible 
for Ogden City to perform: after Robin had purchased the surface 
rights, the City was in as good a position as it ever was to sell 
the subsurface material. Robin had no responsibility whatsoever 
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for plaintiff's failure to check the record title to the land and 
so learn that the State, and not Ogden City or Robin, was the 
owner of the subsurface material it wanted* 
In the light of the uncontroverted facts the Trial 
Court's findings to the effect that plaintiff's damages, if any, 
was not caused by any breach of contract or any misrepresentation 
by defendants, but was caused by the misapprehension and 
misunderstanding of plainiff's representatives, who never 
bothered to ascertain the facts behind or the legal meaning of 
the "option," is eminently correct* 
As above outlined, Mr* Robin reasonably and justifiably 
relied upon the representations of the City authorities regarding 
the contents and effect of the outstanding option. Indeed, the 
uncontradicted evidence discloses, and the Trial Court found, tha 
the information they furnished Robin upon the alleged contract 
was accurate, and that the so-called option merely fixed the 
price at which materials, if any, would be sold, and did not bin* 
the City or its successors to sell any materials* And even if 
Mr* Robin could be held to be negligent in proceeding to buy the 
property without further inquiry as to details, he would not be 
liable to the plaintiff under the principles on which the plaint 
relies. The plaintiff cites and relies upon 86» CJS. TORTS Sectic 
43 & 44# And yet that authority itself states positively that 
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f,Mere negligent interference with a contract. , • . will not 
subject a person to liability, . , . Similarly, one does not 
induce another to commit a breach of contract with a third person 
when he merely enters into an agreement with the other with 
knowledge that the other cannot perform both it and his contract 
third person, • • .,f Ibid, , Section 44, Notes 4 & 7., 
The same work states; 
fln order that the interference may constitute 
a tort, the contract must be valid, and con-
tracts void for illegallity, or by reason of 
repugnance to public policy, have been held 
not to be within the rule extending protection 
against interference with existing contractual 
rights." Ibid,, Notes 13 & 14. 
In Soter v, Wasatch Development Corporation, 21 Utah 2nd 
P, 2nd 663, this Honorable Court adopted the general rule 
as to the necessary elements of a cause of action for interference 
with a contract. The court said: 
"In order to establish a right to recover on 
such a cause of action the plaintiffs would 
have to show that the defendants, without 
justification, b£ some wrongful and malicious 
act, interferred with the plaintiffs1 right 
of contract and that actual damage resulted, 
(Emphasis Supplied,) 
Here there is no allegation and no proof that either 
Robin or Hardy Scales acted wrongfully or maliciously; on the 
contrary all of the evidence is that they acted in entire good 
with the 
224, 443 
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faith and with the intention of according to the Road Commission 
and its successors any and all rights they might have. Even if 
it should be considered that malice should be inferred from an 
intentional interference with a contract right without 
justification or excuse, here there is no proof whatever that Mr. 
Robin or his company intended by the purchase of an interest in 
the land to interfere with the option contract. The evidence is 
to the contrary, and the plaintiff caused its own damages by 
walking away from the option, even when told by Clay Barnard that 
plaintiff should see his boss (Mr. Robin) about materials. 
Neither is there sufficient, or any evidence that Robin 
acted with knowledge that there was an effective option contract. 
In order to charge Robin with a tort, it must be proven that he 
had actual knowledge of the contract, and the proof is only that 
he had knowledge there was some contract, relating to the 
materials, and that he should give the Commission the first 
refusal on any materials sold. 
Finally, as the Trial Court properly concluded, there 
w a s
 ££ v&lid contract in existence and no rights based thereon 
with which Mr, Robin could have interferred. And Robin never 
acquired title to the materials in question and hence he could not 
have sold them even if he had been asked to sell them and had 
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wanted to sell them. For him to sell them would have been a 
conversion of property reserved and belonging to the State of 
Utah. 
And, of course, equity cannot and will not impose upon 
Mr. Robin the obligation to sell materials he never contracted to 
sell and which he never owned or acquired. It is respectfully 
submitted that under the evidence and the law the plaintiff has 
failed to prove a valid option contract for the sale of the 
materials, that the obligations of such contract were imposed 
upon Robin or Hardy Scales, that they or either of them breached 
the contract, or that they or either of them induced Ogden City 
to breach the contract. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor of defendants, on the 
merits, is correct and should be affirmed. 
V 
THE TRIAL COURT IN UTAH NEVER ACQUIRED JURISDICTION 
OVER ROBINS AND HARDY SCALES COMPANY. 
The summons upon defendant-respondents Robin and Hardy 
Scales Company in this case was served upon them outside the 
territorial limits of the State of Utah and in the State of 
California. Plaintiff claims personal jurisdiction over them by 
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virtue of Utah's flLong-Arm Statute," Sections 78-27-22, and 
following, UjCA. No where in its complaint against these 
defendants does the plaintiff plead or attempt to plead that 
these defendants did any of the acts enumerated in the Statute by 
which they would submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of Utah, as set out in Section 78-27-24, UCA, 
notwithstanding the provision of Section 78-27-26, UCA, 
that "Only claims arising from acts enumerated herein may be 
asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction 
over him is based upon this act/1 In other words, the plaintiff 
has failed to plead the facts which it apparently claims would, 
under the law, vest the Utah Trial Court with the extraordinary 
power and authority of obtaining personal jurisdiction by service 
of process upon a defendant outside the State of Utah and within 
territory over which the Utah Court has no jurisdiction. 
Appearing specially, these defendants objected to 
plaintifffs Interrogatories propounded to them as parties defendai 
upon the ground that, without pleading the jurisdictional facts 
justifying extraterritorial service of process, the service was a 
nullity, and the court had no jurisdiction over the persons of 
these defendants to require answer to the interrogatories. Judge 
Hyde sustained these objections upon the grounds stated (R. 104). 
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These defendants then raised the same defenses of invalid service 
of summons and of lack of jurisdiction over their persons in the 
first two defenses set out in their answer* Of course these 
defenses were not waived because joined with other defenses in 
the action. Rule 12(b). URCP* 
On plaintiff's motion to determine these defenses in 
advance of the other issues, Judge Gould, in effect reversing his 
fellow Judge Hyde, overruled these defenses and denied the 
defendants motions for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of the 
person, specifying however that this question was reserved and 
should be determined at the trial on the merits* As hereinbefore 
indicated, it never was fully determined* 
Generally service of process outside of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the issuing court is a nullity, for the process 
of a court ordinarily has no force outside its jurisdiction, and 
the sovereignty of the state itself does not embrace authority to 
control the manner of executing process to the extent of making 
lawful any service against a person without the jurisdiction of 
the state's court as a basis for a personal judgment. 21^  CJS 
COURTS« Section 83, Page 125. & Section jtt* 
It is axiomatic that where the jurisdiction of a court 
is limited in any way, the burden is upon the one invoking the 
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jurisdiction to plead and to prove the facts which will bring the 
case within the limits. This is true, for instance of Federal 
Courts (32. Am Jur_ 2nd. FEDERAL PRACTICE
 % Section 168; and McNutt 
y>» General Motors Acceptance Corporation. 298 U.S. 178. 80 L.Ed. 
1135) and in the City Courts of the State of Utah (Hardy v. 
Meadows. 71 Utah 255. 264. P.. 968,, and Mathison v. Poultry & 
Stock Mineral Mining Company. 85. Utah 74,, 38, P_. 2nd. 741). 
As indicated, it is also axiomatic that the 
jurisdiction of a State Court is limited to the state boundary, 
absent special circumstances which might extend that 
jurisdiction into another state. Accordingly, as the Long-Arm 
Statute under certain particularized and limited circumstances 
specified in the act extends the authority of the court's process 
beyond the place where it has general jurisdiction, the burden is 
on the plaintiff here to plead in its complaint (which it has not 
done), and to prove that these defendants did acts within the 
State of Utah which bring them within the limited purview of the 
Long-Arm Statute. McKanna v. Edgar (1965, Texas) 388 SW 2nd 927; 
Taylor v. Portland Paramount Corporation (CA 9th) 383 F. 2nd 634; 
a n d
 Lebensfeld v. Tuch, 252 NYS 2nd 594. 
It is respectfully submitted that the order of Judge 
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Hyde, ruling that the service of summons upon these defendants 
in California without pleading the facts bringing the case 
within the Long-Arm Statute was void and ineffective and that 
the Court had no jurisdiction over the persons of these 
defendants, was correct and established the law of the case so 
far as the District Court is concerned, and that it was error 
for his brother, Judge Gould, thereafter effectively to overrule 
and set aside the decision of Judge Hyde (Peterson v. Peterson» 
(December 27, 1974) Utah , 530 P. 2nd 821). 
And to compel these defendants, over whom the court 
actually had no jurisdiction, as above demonstrated, to go to 
the great trouble and expense of coming to Utah to try issues 
with respect to which they were not before the court, and then 
to defend an appeal upon the Trial Court's decision of those 
issues, thus burdening the courts with unnecessary and ineffective 
proceedings, was even greater error, which should be corrected. 
CONCLUSION 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the 
judgment of the court below dismissing plaintiff's action as 
to these defendants should be affirmed, and/or should be extended 
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to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction over these 
defendants personally. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL THATCHER, of 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondeni 
Robin & Hardy Scales Company 
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